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Abstract
How do networks form and what is their ultimate topology? Most of the literature that addresses
these questions assumes complete information: agents know in advance the value of linking to other
agents, even with agents they have never met and with whom they have had no previous interaction
(direct or indirect). This paper addresses the same questions under what seems to us to be the
much more natural assumption of incomplete information: agents do not know in advance – but
must learn – the value of linking to agents they have never met. We show that the assumption
of incomplete information has profound implications for the process of network formation and the
topology of networks that ultimately form. Under complete information, the networks that form
and are stable typically have a star, wheel or core-periphery form, with high-value agents in the core.
Under incomplete information, the presence of positive externalities (the value of indirect links) implies
that a much wider collection of network topologies can emerge and be stable. Moreover, even when
the topologies that emerge are the same, the locations of agents can be very different. For instance,
when information is incomplete, it is possible for a hub-and-spokes network with a low-value agent
in the center to form and endure permanently: an agent can achieve a central position purely as the
result of chance rather than as the result of merit. Perhaps even more strikingly: when information
is incomplete, a connected network could form and persist even if, when information were complete,
no links would ever form, so that the final form would be a totally disconnected network. All of this
can occur even in settings where agents eventually learn everything so that information, although
initially incomplete, eventually becomes complete.
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1 Introduction
How do social and economic networks form and what is their ultimate shape (topology)? The
literature, which includes [13], [4], [2], [12] and [3], has addressed these questions in both
static and dynamic contexts. The central conclusion of this work is that special shapes of
networks can occur and persist. However, this literature makes the strong assumption of
complete information: agents know in advance the value of linking to other agents - even
agents they have never met and with whom they have had no previous interaction (direct or
indirect). The present paper addresses the same questions under what seems to us to be the
much more natural assumption of incomplete information: agents do not know in advance – but
must learn – the values of linking to agents they have never met1. As is usual in environments
of incomplete information, agents begin only with beliefs about the values of linking to other
agents, make choices on the basis of their beliefs, and update their beliefs (learn the true values)
on the basis of their experience (history). The network topology is then endogenously decided
as a result of agents’ strategic interaction.
We show that the assumption of incomplete information has profound implications for both
the process of network formation and the topology of networks that ultimately form. When
information is complete, the networks that form and persist typically have a star or core-
periphery form, with high-value agents in the core. By contrast, when information is incomplete,
a much larger variety of networks and network shapes can form and persist. Indeed, the set of
networks that can form and persist when information is incomplete is a superset (typically a
strict superset) of the set of networks that can form and persist when information is complete.
Moreover, even when the network shapes that form are the same or similar, the locations of
agents within the network can be very different. For instance, when information is incomplete,
it is possible for a star network with a low-value agent in the center to form and persist
indefinitely; thus, an agent can achieve a central position purely as the result of chance rather
than as the result of merit. Perhaps even more strikingly, when information is incomplete,
a connected network can form and persist even if, when information were complete, no links
would ever form so that the final form would be a totally disconnected network.
However, the most important consequence of incomplete information is not that a larger
variety of network shapes (topologies) might emerge, but that the particular shape that does
emerge depends on the history of link formation and of link formation opportunities. For
instance, when information is incomplete, agents i, j might choose to form a link because each
expects the value of the link to exceed the cost of forming it. Having formed the link, the agents
may learn that their expectations were wrong and so might wish to sever it. However, before
the agents have the opportunity to sever the link, each of them may have formed other links,
so that the indirect value of the link between i and j - the value of the connection to other
agents - may be sufficiently large that they prefer to maintain the link between them after all.2
1We emphasize that we study learning during the network formation process, rather than learning in an
exogenously given and fixed network structure. For a study on the latter, see for example [1]
2Indirect linking provides a positive externality when information is complete as well, but the effect is
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However, whether these other links have formed will depend not only on the values of those
links but also on the random opportunities presented to form them or not.
We stress that all of this can occur even in settings where agents eventually learn everything
so that information, although initially incomplete, eventually becomes complete. Incomplete-
ness of information may eventually disappear but its influence may persist forever.
2 Literature Review
The literature on network formation studies the characteristics of networks emerging as a result
of the strategic interaction of self-interested agents. This literature includes renowned early
papers in this area, including [13], [2], [20], etc. These papers and subsequent works building
on them (for instance [14]) assume that agents are homogeneous, i.e. the value that each agent
in the group provides to and receives from another agent is the same. This is the strongest
form of complete information, in the sense that agents do not only know their exact payoffs
from linking to others, but are also aware that the payoffs are solely determined by the network
topology, and that the agents’ identities play no role in affecting payoff characteristics. As a
result, a prominent feature in network topologies that emerge and/or become stable is that they
are either empty or connected. By contrast, in our paper, agents are of different types and thus
connecting to them results in different (heterogeneous) payoffs; moreover, there is incomplete
information: an agent does not know the types of agents that he has never connected with,
but he is able to form beliefs based on which he chooses the optimal action. Networks which
result under this, more realistic, assumption are strikingly different from those obtained in the
model assuming homogeneous agents and complete information. On one hand, connectedness
is no longer a key property of stable networks - the formation process converges to connected
networks in some range of parameters and to multiple components in other ranges. On the
other hand, even if the network stays empty forever under complete information, a non-empty,
even connected network may emerge and be stable with positive probability under incomplete
information.
In the literature studying how agent heterogeneity affects network formation [11], [7], [9],
[8], [21], [22] [15], complete information is still a common assumption, and the predictions in the
above papers are often restricted to a few, specific, types of network topologies such as stars,
wheels or core-periphery networks with high-value or low-cost agents enjoying higher connectiv-
ity than others. We differ from these works in three aspects. First, as mentioned above, agents
have no precise knowledge about their exact payoffs due to incomplete information; instead,
they choose an optimal action according to their beliefs about the payoffs that they will obtain
from connecting to others. Secondly, we show that the interaction of incomplete information
and agent heterogeneity produces a much wider range of network topologies, which includes
stars, wheels, core-periphery networks, etc. Finally, the topology that emerges and becomes
stable strongly depends on the formation history : an agent may exhibit a high degree of con-
completely different: i, j will never wish to form a link at some point in time and sever it later.
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nectivity in equilibrium not necessarily because he is of a special (high) type but also because
initially he was fortunate to obtain sufficiently many links by chance, which in turn attracted
others to form and maintain links with him due to the large indirect benefits that he can offer.
Therefore, unlike most existing literature that only emphasizes what topologies can be formed,
we argue that how a certain topology comes into being is equally important.
As an important sidenote, we would like to emphasize the difference between this paper and
works such as [15], in which agents choose an optimal level of effort or contribution but the
network formation process remains exogenous, governed by some commonly known stochastic
process. In our model, the network formation process is endogenous, in the sense that agents
choose directly whether to form links with others. The network topology that emerges then is
a result of interaction among individual strategic behavior.
Among the empirical literature on network formation games, works such as [6], [5], [10] and
[19] have conducted experimental studies on the types of emerging topologies. The experimen-
tal results indicate that (1) typical equilibrium network topologies predicted by the existing
theoretical analysis are not always consistent with the empirical observations; especially, stars
are formed only in a proportion of the total number of experiments conducted [5], [19], and
such proportions, under some treatments such as a two-way flow of payoffs, are rather low
[6]; (2) even in the experiments where equilibrium network topologies do emerge with high
frequency, such topologies are developed rather than born [10], which we believe suggests a
dynamic network formation process of a sufficiently long duration as a more appropriate en-
vironment for stable networks to emerge, compared with a static one. Moreover, the study of
networks which actually get formed in large social communities, as presented for instance by
[18] and [16], shows that in environments where agents are heterogeneous and withhold certain
private information in their payoffs from links, numerous phenomena which are not predicted
by the existing theoretical literature (such as multiple components and clustering of agents with
different attributes) can happen. We believe that incorporating incomplete information in the
dynamic network formation game represents a first and important step towards understanding
why several previously seemingly irregular network topologies can emerge and remain stable in
practice.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 introduces the model. Section
4 analyzes the model in detail and interprets the results. Section 5 discusses an alternative
approach in modeling. Section 6 concludes and introduces relevant future research topics.
3 Model
Our notation mainly follows [13], [2] and [20].
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3.1 Networks with Incomplete Information
3.1.1 Networks and the Agents’ Types
Let I = {1, 2, ..., N} denote a group of N agents. Each agent has a private type ki ∈ X , where
X is a type set. We do not impose any specific assumptions on X : it may be finite, countably
infinite, or uncountably infinite, as long as the expected payoff on this type set is well-defined
(details provided in section 3.2). Let ki denote agent i’s type, and let κ = {ki}
N
i=1 denote the
type vector of the agents. The realization of this type vector is drawn i.i.d. for each agent,
with prior probability distribution distribution function H(x) (and probability density function
h(x)3).
A network is denoted by g ⊂ {ij : i, j ∈ I, i 6= j}, and a sub-network of g on I ′ ⊂ I, denoted
gsub(I
′), is defined as a subset of g such that ij ∈ gsub(I
′) if and only if i, j ∈ I ′ and ij ∈ g.
ij is called a link between agents i and j. We assume throughout that links are undirected, in
the sense that we do not specify whether link ij points from i to j or vice versa. A network g
is empty if g = ∅.
We say that agents i and j are connected, denoted i
g
↔ j, if there exist j1, j2, ..., jn for some
n such that ij1, j1j2, ..., jnj ∈ g. Let dij denote the distance, or the smallest number of links
between i and j. If i and j are not connected, define dij := ∞. An agent i in a network is a
singleton if ij /∈ g for any j 6= i.
Let N(g) = {i|∃j s.t. ij ∈ g}. A component of network g is a maximal connected sub-
network, i.e. a set C ⊂ g such that for all i ∈ N(C) and j ∈ N(C), i 6= j, we have i
C
↔ j, and
for any i ∈ N(C) and j ∈ N(g), ij ∈ g implies that ij ∈ C. Let Ci denote the component that
contains link ij for some j 6= i. Unless otherwise specified, in the remaining parts of the paper
we use the word ”component” to refer to any non-empty component.
A network g is said to be empty if g = ∅, and connected if g has only one component which
is itself. g is minimal if for any component C ⊂ g and any link ij ∈ C, C − ij is no longer a
component. g is minimally connected if it is minimal and connected.
3.1.2 Payoff Structure
Following the assumption in literature on networks that explicitly model non-local external-
ities4, such as [13], [20] and [9], we assume that once agents i and j form a link, i not only
obtains payoffs from his immediate neighbor j, but also from the agents that he is indirectly
connected to via that particular link. As stated before, the payoff of an agent also depends on
the type vector. Specifically, an agent i’s payoff from a network g is given by
ui(k−i, g) = ui(k−i, Ci) :=
∑
j
Ci
↔i
δdij−1f(kj)−
∑
j:ij∈Ci
c
3When X is finite, h(x) denotes its probability mass function.
4As opposed to papers that assume pure local externalities, i.e. agents only obtain payoffs from their
immediate neighbors. See for example [8].
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where f : X → R++ is the payoff function for an agent from a link with another agent.
Therefore, f(kj) > 0 denotes the payoff to an agent i by linking to an agent j, whose value
depends on j’s type kj. c > 0 is the cost of maintaining a link, which is assumed to be bilateral
and homogeneous across agents. δ ∈ [0, 1] denotes a common decay factor5, such that the payoff
of i from j with a distance of dij is δ
dij−1f(kj). Note that c is assumed to be independent of
the agents’ types6.
Let E[f(x)] =
∫
X
f(x)dH(x) denote the expected benefit from a link to a single agent, under
the prior type distribution. As mentioned before, the only assumption we require on X (and
functions H and f) is that this expected payoff is well-defined.
3.2 Dynamic Network Formation Game
3.2.1 The Game
We model the dynamic game in a similar fashion to [20] and [12]. Time is discrete and the
horizon is infinite: t = 0, 1, 2, .... The game is played as follows: agents start with an empty
network ∅ in period 0. In each following period, a pair of agents (i, j) is randomly selected
to update the link between them. For simplicity, we assume that the matching probability is
uniform, so (i, j) is selected with probability 2
N(N−1)
. We assume that when agents i and j
are selected, i can observe Cj, and vice versa. The two agents then play a simultaneous move
game, where each can choose to sever the link between them if there is one, and if there is
not, whether to agree to form a link with the other agent. Let aij = 1 denote the action that
i agrees to form a link with j (if there is no existing link) or not to sever the link (if there is
an existing one), and aij = 0 otherwise. A link is formed or maintained after bilateral consent
(i.e. aij = aji = 1). Let γ(t) := {(i, j)t′}
t
t′=1 (t ≥ 1) denote a selection path up to time t, or the
set of selected pairs of agents, ordered from 1 to t. The agents are assumed to be myopic, i.e.
they only care about their current period payoffs.
3.2.2 Updating Rule
With incomplete information, agents maximize their expected payoffs, rather than actual pay-
offs, when deciding the optimal action. Therefore, the belief of an agent on the types of the
other agents plays a crucial role in shaping his behavioral patterns. For any i, we let Bi ∈ ∆X
N
denote agent i’s belief on the type vector of the group, and B = (B1, ..., BN) define a belief
vector for the group of agents. Note that for any i, Bi must put zero probability on any type
vector where i’s type differs from the true type. Moreover, we assume the following simple
updating rule for the agents:
1. If two agents are ever connected, they know each other’s type.
5In this paper, unless otherwise specified, we assume that δ ∈ (0, 1).
6We make this assumption to economize on notations. In the case where costs are also heterogeneous, our
analysis and results hold with slightly modified conditions.
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2. Otherwise, their belief on each other’s type remains at the prior.
In other words, agents can only observe their own formation history: they do not observe the
actions by agents in other components and thus make no relevant inferences on their types.
A similar assumption appears in [17], which is denoted as imperfect monitoring and describes
agents’ inability to observe all other agents’ strategies in a static network formation game. A
plausible alternative updating rule is to allow agents to observe each other’s past actions and
perform Bayesian updating accordingly, which results in very complicated belief formation. We
will discuss this in a later section. Throughout the paper, we assume that the updating rule is
common knowledge among the agents.
4 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the nature of the network formation process and show a clear contrast
between results under complete information and incomplete information. We begin by defining
the solution concept for the two-player game each period, and the notion of a stable network.
4.1 Stable Optimistic Equilibrium and Stable Network
4.1.1 Stable Optimistic Equilibrium
Let C denote the set of all possible components (including the empty component), i.e. when
agents i and j are selected, for agent i, C is the set of all possible observations of Cj. Let B denote
the set of all possible beliefs for an agent. Denote K = X × C × B as the set of information7
for an agent who is selected to update a link. The interpretation of knowledge is the following:
the first argument is the agent’s own type, the second argument is the component containing
his counterparty, i.e. the other agent selected, and the third argument is his current belief on
the type vector.
Now we define an agent’s (pure) strategy in the two-player game after a pair of agents is
selected, followed by our proposed solution concept, which we call a stable optimistic equilibrium
(SOE):
Definition 1. Agent i’s (pure) strategy towards j is sij : K → {0, 1}, a function from agent i’s
set of information to his set of actions.
Definition 2. A strategy profile s = (sij, sji) is a stable optimistic equilibrium (SOE) if: (1) it
is mutual best response; (2) sij = 1 if
E[ui(ki, k−i, (Ci ∪ Cj) + ij)|Bi] ≥ ui(ki, k−i, Ci)
7Technically speaking, agent i’s information also includes Ci, but omitting such information does not affect
the existence and any property of the equilibrium we define below.
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In words, a SOE is an equilibrium where any agent would choose to agree to form a link (if
there is no existing link) or choose not to sever the link (if there is an existing one) as long as
the expected payoff from the link is non-negative. It is stable because the prescribed strategy is
robust to small probabilistic changes in the counterparty’s strategy when the above inequality
is strict. More specifically, if some agent j other than i changes sji with a sufficiently small
probability ǫ, i’s best response would not change. It is optimistic in the sense that it excludes
the “pessimistic”, or null equilibria in which no link formation occurs even though each agent
has a non-negative expected payoff from the potential link8. In other words, agents choose to
link when they are at least indifferent. The following lemma shows the existence and uniqueness
of such an equilibrium.
Lemma 1. In every period, for any pair of selected agents, any network topology and any belief
vector according to the simple updating rule, a SOE exists and is unique.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 together with the above robustness property of a SOE ensures that the outcome
of the formation process is unique and robust to small perturbation.
4.1.2 Stable Network
Let g(γ(t)) denote the unique network formed after period t, following a selection path of
γ(t). Let B(γ(t)) denote the associated belief vector after period t. By Lemma 1 we know
that both g(γ(t)) and B(γ(t)) are well-defined. Let σ(t) := (γ(t), {g(γ(t′))}tt′=1) denote a
formation history up to time t. We say that:
1. A network together with the associated beliefs (g, B) can emerge if there exists a selection
path γ(t) for some t, such that g = g(γ(t)), B = B(γ(t)).
2. (g, B) is a stable network if no link is formed or broken given any subsequent selection path.
3. The formation process can converge to g if there exists a selection path γ(t) for some
t, such that g = g(γ(t)) and (g(γ(t)), B(γ(t))) is stable. Mathematically, we denote it as
limt→∞ g(γ(t)) = g for some fixed γ(∞).
4.2 Contrast with Complete Information
Before discussing the differences between the network topologies that can emerge and be stable
under complete information and incomplete information, we first inspect how long incomplete
information can persist. We say that information is complete when every agent’s belief is the
8In fact, it is easy to see that except in the cases with indifference, there cannot be any equilibrium in which
a link is formed with positive probability and agents use type-dependent strategies. Therefore, in most cases
the SOE and the null equilibria are the only two categories of equilibria.
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degenerate belief on the true type vector κ, i.e. Prob(κ|Bi) = 1 for any i, and that information
is incomplete otherwise.
Proposition 1. For any κ:
1. If E[f(x)] < c, information is never complete: agents’ beliefs stay at the prior.
2. If E[f(x)] ≥ c, information becomes complete within finitely many periods almost surely,
and information is complete in any stable network.
Proof. See Appendix.
In essence, when the expected benefit from a link under the prior exceeds the link formation
cost, everyone eventually learns the true type vector with probability 1 over time. Indeed, as
agents are willing to form links with others of unknown type, after sufficiently many periods the
probability of unconnected agents still existing in the group would be arbitrarily small. In other
words, the effect of incomplete information and thus the difference with complete information
only occurs in an early stage of the formation process.
Nevertheless, even though Proposition 1 may leave the impression that incomplete infor-
mation is not so important as it only takes effect in the short run, we will emphasize in the
following analysis that such short-term influence is actually persistent over time.
Let GC(κ) = {g : g = g(γ(t)) for some γ(t)} denote the set of networks that can emerge
under complete information given κ, and GIC(κ) that under incomplete information. Similarly,
let G∗C(κ) = {g ∈ GC(κ) : g = limt→∞ g(γ(t)) for some γ(∞)} denote the set of networks
that can emerge and be stable under complete information given κ, and G∗IC(κ) that under
incomplete information.
Theorem 1. For any κ:
1. If E[f(x)] < c, GIC(κ) = G
∗
IC(κ) = {∅}.
2. If E[f(x)] ≥ c, GIC(κ) ⊃ GC(κ), and G
∗
IC(κ) ⊃ G
∗
C(κ).
Proof. If E[f(x)] < c: as in the proof of Proposition 1, no link would ever form and thus the
only network that can emerge (and be stable) is the empty network.
If E[f(x)] ≥ c: for any g ∈ GC(κ):
If g is empty: since g ∈ GC(κ), there must exist two agents i, j such that f(ki) < c or
f(kj) < c. Consider the selection path γ(2) = ((i, j)1, (i, j)2) under incomplete information. It
is clear that a link would form between i and j in period 1, but the link would then be severed
in period 2, and thus g = g(γ(2)), which implies that g ∈ GIC(κ).
If g is non-empty: consider any selection path γC(t) such that g emerges for the first time in
period t. By the definition of GC(κ), we know that such γC(t) exists. Let γIC(t
′) be a selection
path constructed from γC(t) such that the pairs of agents in γC(t) between whom there is no
existing link, but a new link is not formed either, are deleted.
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Consider the formation process under incomplete information given γIC(t
′). By the simple
updating rule, we know that given the same network structure, if a link is formed between i and
j under complete information, it will also be formed under incomplete information regardless
of whether i and j know each other’s type. Also, it is clear that the decision of severing a link
by any agent is the same under complete information and incomplete information, since such a
decision is based on the realized payoff. Therefore, the formation process yields the same link
formation and severance results under complete information given γC(t) and under incomplete
information given γIC(t
′). Hence given γIC(t
′), g emerges for the first time in period t′ under
incomplete information, which implies that g ∈ GIC(κ). Therefore GC(κ) ∈ GIC(κ).
By the above argument, we already know that any network that can emerge under complete
information can also emerge under incomplete information. Thus it suffices to show that, for
any network g ∈ G∗C(κ), there exists a subsequent selection path under incomplete information
after g’s first appearance that would make g stable. We prove the result by construction.
If g is empty: consider the selection path γ(N(N−1)
2
) such that every pair of agents is selected
exactly twice consecutively. Since by assumption g ∈ G∗C(κ), we know that for every pair of
agents a link would first form and then be severed in the next period. In period N(N−1)
2
+ 1,
information is complete and the empty network becomes stable.
If g is non-empty: denoting the number of components in g as q(g), under incomplete in-
formation let the subsequent selection path after g’s first appearance be such that in the first
q(g)(q(g)−1) periods, two agents from different components are selected exactly twice consec-
utively and every two components are involved. Since by assumption g ∈ G∗C(κ), which means
that g is stable under complete information, when a pair of agents from different components is
selected for the second time, either there is no existing link between them and no link would be
formed, or an existing link would be severed. In either case, the agents know each other’s type
as well as the types of agents in the counterparty’s component. Therefore, after q(g)(q(g)− 1)
periods, every agent knows κ and essentially there is no incomplete information. Again by the
assumption that g ∈ G∗C(κ), we can conclude that g is such that no link would be formed or
severed in any later period given any selection path. Thus g ∈ G∗IC(κ), which completes the
proof.
Theorem 1 states that when expected benefits are sufficiently high, if some network can
emerge (and be stable) under complete information, then it can also do so under incomplete
information. Intuitively, if a link could be formed under complete information, then given
high expected benefits and the simple updating rule, it can also be formed under incomplete
information, whether or not the relevant agents know each other’s type. Note that the reverse
is not necessarily true: even if a link could be formed under incomplete information, it may not
form under complete information because the expected payoffs are sufficiently higher than the
realized payoffs, i.e. in the incomplete information setting, were the agents to know each other’s
type beforehand, the link may never be formed. In other words, under incomplete information,
high expected payoffs can initialize link formation such that even though agents would “regret”
the links they form after knowing each other’s type, more links have formed before they are
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selected again to update their initial links. Then due to increasing returns to link formation, the
positive externalities would in turn ensure that the initial links are maintained. The following
example illustrates this point.
Example 1. Assume the following: N = 5, X = {a, b}, ki = b ∀i = 1, ..., 5, and the other
parameters are such that f(b) < c, E[f(x)] ≥ c, (1 + δ − δ2 − δ3)f(b) ≥ c.
Consider the following selection path: (1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 5), (1, 5). Under complete
information, it is clear that the network remains empty regardless of the selection path, as in
Figure 1(A). Under incomplete information, the SOE can be explicitly computed in each period.
For example, in period 1, agent 1’s expected payoff from the link with agent 2 is E[f(x)] ≥ c
and vice versa, and thus the link is formed. The formation process is shown in Figure 1(B).
Figure 1: Empty under Complete Info. vs. Connected under Incomplete Info.
According to the assumptions on parameters, one can then easily show that the network
formed in period 5 is stable.
Another feature of incomplete information is the history dependence of the formation pro-
cess, in the sense that the ultimate network topology depends greatly on the selection path.
As a result, even if a type is more valuable or preferable than the other, under incomplete
information it is not necessary that an agent of that type ends up with a higher connectivity
degree. Consider the following example: assume the same parameter values as in Example 1,
and consider a group of agents consisting of 4 type a agents and 5 type b agents. There exists a
selection path such that: under complete information, the formation process converges to a star
network with only type a agents (Figure 2(A)); under incomplete information, the formation
process converges to a ”hub-and-spokes” network (Figure 2(B))9.
Under complete information, the center of the star network has to be a type a agent since
no type b agent ever gets linked with anyone else. By contrast, under incomplete information,
it first becomes possible for two type b agents to form a link; and then, as it turns out in this
particular topology, each type b agent’s distance with the type a agent is sufficiently small. Even
9One such selection path is (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 6), (3, 7), (6, , 7), (1, 5), (5, 9), (6, 9), (1, 4), (4, 8), (7, 8), (8, 9),
(2.5), (3, 5), (4, 5).
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Figure 2: Different Connectivity Degree Distributions
though the type a agent has a low connectivity degree, the other agents do not find a new link
with the type a agent attractive, because it does not offer sufficient indirect benefits. Hence,
the one agent with the more valuable type – type a – ends up with the lowest connectivity
degree in the network. This is in stark contrast with the existing results in the literature (for
instance [8]), which often show that a more valuable agent is better connected. This example
also highlights and clarifies the point made by Theorem 1: incomplete information generates
a superset of networks, not links, as compared with complete information. In other words,
new and different networks can be formed under incomplete information, rather than a mere
addition of links to networks formed under complete information. Indeed, the network in Figure
2(A) has 3 links and that in Figure 2(B) has 12, but they share no links in common.
Also, even when E[f(x)] ≥ c, incomplete information does not imply a greater number of
links. For instance, let X = {a, b}, and consider a group of 8 type a agents (indexed 1, 2, · · · , 8)
and 1 type b agent (indexed 9). The payoffs are f(b) < c, f(a) ≥ c, (1−δ)f(a) < c ≤ (1−δ2)f(a)
and E[f(x)] ≥ c. Let the selection path be as follows: first, select 9 once with each of 1-8. Then
select 12, 23, · · · , 78, 81. Finally, select 15, 26, 37, 48. The convergence result is shown in
Figure 3 below: under complete information, the network has 12 links, while under incomplete
information it has only 8.
Furthermore, under incomplete information, the probability that the formation process con-
verges to a different network topology from those under complete information can be significant.
The following figure shows simulation results10. Under complete information, no type b agent
would ever get linked; under incomplete information, the frequency that some type b agent
remains linked by the end rises to more than 0.8 for a range of the group size N .
The above examples also indicate that, unlike in most existing literature that specifies only
a few types of network topologies as the only possible ones in equilibrium, under incomplete
10We assume for the simulation that δ = 0.8 and p = 0.5. For each value of N , we run 500 simulations and
average the results. Each simulation consists of a fixed long run of 5N(N − 1) periods, so that each link is
selected for 10 times on average.
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Figure 3: More Links under Complete Information
Figure 4: Simulation: Significant Probability of Difference
information the formation process can converge to potentially more types of networks, as there
may exist some network g which can emerge and be stable under incomplete information, but
not under complete information. We define some typical network structures in the literature
and the empirical works below:
1. g is complete if ij ∈ g ∀i, j such that i 6= j.
2. g is a star network if there exists i ∈ I such that ij ∈ g ∀j 6= i, j ∈ I and i′j /∈ g ∀i′, j 6= i.
3. g is a core-periphery network if there exists non-empty I ′ ( I, such that ij ∈ g ∀i, j ∈ I ′, i 6=
j, and that ∀j′ ∈ I \ I ′, ij′ ∈ g for some i ∈ I ′ and jj′ /∈ g ∀j 6= i. Note that a star network is
a special case of a core-periphery network.
4. g is a tree network if there exists a partition of I, I1, ..., In, such that (1)#(I1) = 1;
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(2)∀n′ = 2, ..., n, each agent in In′ has one and only one link with some agent in In′−1; (3)no
other link exists.11
5. g is a wheel network if there exists a bijection π : I → I such that g = {π−1(1)π−1(2),
π−1(2)π−1(3), ..., π−1(N − 1)π−1(N)}.
Theorem 2. Assume that E[f(x)] ≥ c. For any κ, if a network g is stable and belongs to one
of the following categories:
1. Empty network;
2. Minimally connected network (i.e. tree network, including star network);
3. Fully connected network;
4. Core-periphery network;
5. Wheel network.
then g ∈ G∗IC(κ).
Proof. By the assumption that g is connected and stable, it suffices to show that when g
belongs to any of the categories there exists a selection path such that g can emerge in the
formation process. We discuss case by case and prove by construction below.
1: See the proof of Theorem 1.
2: let L be the total number of links in g. Let the selection path be such that the pair of
agents for each link in g is selected once and only once in the first L periods. Since E[f(x)] ≥ c,
we know that each link will be formed, and thus g emerges in period L.
3: Since g is fully connected and stable, we know that for any two agents i and j, (1 −
δ)f(ki) ≥ c. Therefore regardless of the selection path g would emerge.
4: Let the selection path be such that: first each periphery agent is selected once and only
once with their corresponding core agent, then every two core agents are selected once and only
once before any other pair of agents is selected. By Assumption 2 and the assumption that g
is stable, we know that each link will be formed, and thus g emerges after the last pair of core
agents is selected.
5: Let the selection path be such that the pair of agents for each link in g is selected once
and only once in the first N −1 periods. By Assumption 2 and the assumption that g is stable,
we know that each link will be formed, and thus g emerges in period N − 1.
Theorem 2 explicitly characterizes types of connected networks that can emerge and be
stable under incomplete information, and most typical networks in both the literature and
empirical studies are included. However, note that there may be some stable networks that
cannot emerge under complete or incomplete information – e.g. networks with links such that
11Essentially, a tree network is equivalent to a minimally connected network, and a star network is a special
case of a tree network.
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(1) the benefit from any one link cannot cover the maintenance cost without the existence of
the other links and (2) the network would still be connected if these links were severed. Such
network topologies may never be formed since only one pair of agents is selected in each period,
and the agents are myopic.
4.3 Characterizing Topological Differences
In the previous analysis, we have seen that even with the same selection path, very different
networks can emerge and be stable under incomplete information; in this section, we formalize
a way of describing such topological differences, and characterize the corresponding conditions
under which these differences are achieved.
Consider a selection path such that the formation process converges under both complete
and incomplete information. The following lemma establishes its existence.
Lemma 2. For any κ, there always exists a γ(∞) such that the formation process converges
under both complete and incomplete information.
Proof. See Appendix.
We say that the difference between the network topologies is minimal if the formation
process converges to the same network, and maximal if at least one of the networks is non-
empty, and they have no common links. In addition, we say that i is a low-value agent if
f(ki) < c, a medium-value agent if (1 − δ)f(ki) < c ≤ f(ki) and a high-value agent if
(1−δ)f(ki) ≥ c. Let nl, nm and nh denote the number of agents in the corresponding category.
Proposition 2. For any κ, the following properties hold:
1. If E[f(x)] < c, then the minimal difference can be achieved if nm+nh ≤ 1, and the maximal
difference can be achieved otherwise.
2. If E[f(x)] ≥ c, then the minimal difference can always be achieved, and:
– a. If nh ≥ 2 or nl = 0, then the maximal difference cannot be achieved.
– b. If nh < 2 and nl > 0, then the maximal difference can be achieved if (1) nm + nh is
sufficiently large, or (2) nm+nh ≥ 2, δ is sufficiently close to 1 and nl is sufficiently large.
Proof. See Appendix.
Case 2(b) in the above proposition is of particular interest, because apart from achieving
the maximal difference, it also highlights the particular types of network topology that can
result in such a difference. When nm + nh is sufficiently large, a star network with a low-value
agent can emerge and be stable under incomplete information, which immediately implies that
there are no common links with any stable network under complete information. When nl is
sufficiently large, a line network (i.e. a tree network with only one agent in each subset in
the partition of I) under incomplete information, where low-value agents and medium-value or
high-value agents are linked alternately, will ensure the maximal difference.
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4.4 Social Welfare
An alternative and very important way of comparing complete and incomplete information
is to evaluate the upper bound in social welfare in the two cases. Formally, let WC(κ) and
WIC(κ) be the maximum social welfare that can be achieved by a network in G
∗
C(κ) and G
∗
IC(κ)
respectively. By Theorem 1, it is clear that under incomplete information, if E[f(x)] ≥ c, this
welfare upper bound is weakly higher than that under complete information, but we aim further
at characterizing conditions under which the maximum social welfare in one case is strictly
higher than, equal to, or strictly lower than that in the other case.
Lemma 3. Under both complete and incomplete information, if some stable network g1 is a
proper superset of some other stable network g2, then every agent’s payoff is weakly higher in
g1 than in g2. As a result, g1 yields a weakly higher social welfare than g2.
Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma clarifies the social welfare relation between two stable networks when one con-
tains the other. Then we can show the following result:
Proposition 3. For any κ, the following properties hold:
1. If E[f(x)] < c, then WC(κ) = WIC(κ) if nm + nh ≤ 1, and WC(κ) > WIC(κ) otherwise.
2. If E[f(x)] ≥ c, then WC(κ) ≤WIC(κ), and:
– a. If nl = 0, then WC(κ) = WIC(κ).
– b. If nl > 0 and nm+nh = 1, then WC(κ) < WIC(κ) if there exists a stable wheel network
among a subset of the agents.
– c. If nl > 0 and nm + nh > 1, then WC(κ) < WIC(κ) if δ is sufficiently close to 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Just as Proposition 2, this result points to particular network topologies (2(b) and 2(c))
that bring about a clear welfare comparison. When nl > 0 and nm+nh = 1, the empty network
is the only stable one that can emerge under complete information; for any other network that
can emerge under incomplete information to be stable, the network must exhibit a ”wheel-like”
feature, i.e. apart from the medium-value or high-value agent, every agent must have at least
two links. And once such a network is stable, it can be immediately shown that it yields a
strictly positive social welfare. When nl > 0 and nm + nh > 1, as δ gets sufficiently close to
1 the network that yields the highest social welfare must be minimal; then under incomplete
information, there always exists a way to ”insert” a low-value agent between two medium-value
or high-value agents, which brings almost no change to the payoffs of the medium-value or
high-value agents (since δ is close to 1) but generates a strictly positive payoff for the low-value
agent. Therefore, social welfare is strictly improved.
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5 Alternative Updating Rules
The results we have derived so far are based on the simple updating rule, which assumes that
every agent’s posterior belief on another agent’s type is binary: either it is the degenerate
belief on the true type, or the prior. Note again that such an updating rule implicitly assumes
that agents can only observe their own formation history. If the agents adopt a different
updating rule, which reflects either more or less available information, the formation process
can exhibit a much different pattern. We discuss one such alternative in detail, which we call
Bayesian learning by formation history.
We assume that agents can observe the entire formation history, i.e. the pair of agents
selected and the resulting network structure each period, in addition to knowing the types
of agents connected to themselves. They then apply Bayesian updating in forming posterior
beliefs. The following result highlights the key difference between the simple learning rule and
this alternative.
Proposition 4. Under Bayesian learning by formation history, assume that in the prior type
distribution, the probability of an agent being low-value is positive. Then for any agent i of type
ki, when there are sufficiently many low-value agents, there exists a formation history σ(t) for
some t such that E[f(ki)|σ(t)] < c.
Proof. See Appendix.
A major implication here is that Bayesian learning by formation history makes it possible
for the posterior probability of an agent being of high type to fall close to 0. As a result, even if
making a link with some agent i is incentivized with the simple learning rule, it may no longer
be the case under Bayesian learning by formation history, given some particular selection path
that would drag posterior beliefs towards i being of type b. The following example illustrates
this difference.
Example 2. Assume the following: N = 5, X = {a, b}, ki = b ∀i = 1, ..., 5, and the other
parameters are such that f(b) < c, E[f(x)] ≥ c, (1 + δ − δ2 − δ3)f(b) ≥ c. Let p = h(a), and
assume that p(1−p)
1−p2
f(a) + p(1−p)+(1−p)
2
1−p2
f(b) < c. Consider the following selection path in period
1-9: (1, 3), (1, 3), (2, 4), (2, 4), (1, 2), (3, 4), (4, 5), (2, 3), (1, 5). Note that in this environment
with pure peer effect, the existence of a SOE (and thus the uniqueness) is still valid under
Bayesian learning by formation history, as any agent’s expected payoff from any link is not
affected by his own type.
Under the simple learning rule, the formation process is shown in Figure 5(A). The network
formed in period 9 is stable; under Bayesian learning by formation history, the formation process
is shown in Figure 5(B). The network formed in period 4 is stable.
Here with the simple learning rule, agents hold the prior belief each time they are selected
with another agent with an unknown type, and thus the given selection path induces a connected
network at last. Yet with Bayesian learning by formation history, each agent updates from their
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Figure 5: Connected under Simple Updating Rule vs. Empty under Bayesian Learning by
Formation History
observation to conclude that others are low-value with a sufficiently large probability, and thus
are unwilling to make any link.
One implication of the above proposition and example is that more learning can sometimes
be “bad”, i.e. it may lead to inefficient outcomes. Despite the specific differences brought about
by an alternative updating rule, our general results still hold under a range of parameters. For
instance, it can be shown that if any typical network as depicted in Theorem 2 can emerge and
be stable under complete information, then it can under incomplete information and Bayesian
learning by formation history as well.
6 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper we analyzed the network formation process under agent heterogeneity and in-
complete information. Our results are in stark contrast with the existing literature: instead
of restricting the equilibrium network topologies to fall into one or two specific categories, our
model generates a great variety of network types. Besides what networks can emerge as a result
of convergence, we argue that it is also important to understand how a network gets formed,
since we want to know, for instance, why some agents become central and others do not. While
link formation and belief formation are usually treated as two independent processes to be
studied separately, we combine them in our model and show that belief formation is in fact a
key factor that could facilitate or deter link formation. Even if incomplete information vanishes
in the long run, its impact on shaping the network topology is persistent.
Several future research topics can be built up on the basis of our model. One of these
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challenges is to pin down the structure of an efficient network and implement it in a game-
theoretic setting. The usual definition on efficiency in networks adopted in the literature is
strong efficiency, i.e. a network is strongly efficient if it maximizes the sum of agents’ payoffs.
In general, we know that a strongly efficient network must exist (though not necessarily be
unique) because the set of possible network structures is finite. However, since payoffs are
heterogeneous across agents according to the type vector, the exact topology of an efficient
network becomes difficult to characterize; moreover, the efficient network may not be unique
because in an agent-heterogeneous environment there could be multiple ways of generating the
same level of social welfare.
Most importantly, we have assumed throughout, as does most of the literature, that agents
are myopic rather than forward-looking. If it is assumed otherwise that agents are foresighted
and are concerned about both their current and future welfare, then the aim of analysis es-
sentially becomes solving an agent’s dynamic optimization problem in the presence of other
similarly foresighted agents. One can then easily anticipate a very different evolution pattern
of network topologies as well as very different stable network topologies in the limit, for now
link formation does not only serve as an action of maximizing the current expected payoff, but
also as a way of acquiring information for potential future benefit. It is our conjecture that
link formation would be more frequent at least in an early stage of the formation process, since
on top of the incentives already discussed in this paper, agents may also be willing to endure
current payoff losses in return for valuable information about the type vector.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume that agents i and j are selected in some period. Based on the
simple updating rule, either i and j know each other’s type, or their belief on each other’s type
remains at the prior. If they know each other’s type, then since actions are binary for each
agent, the strategy described in a SOE exists and is unique for each agent. It is also clear that
the strategy is a best response for each agent since it is a weakly dominant strategy.
If the agents do not know each other’s type, and hence their belief remains at the prior,
then if E[f(x)] ≥ 0, it is indeed mutual best response for the agents to agree regardless of their
own types; similarly, if E[f(x)] < 0, it is again mutual best response for the agents not to agree
regardless of their own types. Therefore, the strategy profile described in a SOE is indeed an
equilibrium. Finally, it is clear that such a profile is unique.
Proof of Proposition 1. If E[X ] < c: by inspecting the SOE we know that for any pair of
agents selected, no link would be formed in any period. Therefore, no agent ever learns the
type of any other agent, and the beliefs would stay at the prior.
If E[X ] ≥ c: we first show that information becomes complete within finitely many periods
almost surely. It suffices to show that any two agents are connected for at least one period
within finitely many periods almost surely. Since E[X ] ≥ c, by the definition of SOE it further
suffices to show that any two agents are selected at least once within finitely many periods
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almost surely. Consider any two agents i and j; the probability of the event that they are not
selected in one period is 1 − 2
N(N−1)
< 1, and thus the probability of this event occurring for
infinitely many periods is 0.
Next, we show that information must be complete in any stable network. If g is connected,
then clearly there is complete information. If g is unconnected and information is not complete,
then there must exist two unconnected agents such that their beliefs on each other’s type remain
at the prior. When they are selected they would form a link, which implies that (g, B) is not
stable, a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider the following selection path:
1. Fix a high-value agent i∗. In the first nm + nh − 1 periods, select i
∗ and every other
medium-value or high-value agent.
2. In the following 2nl periods, select i
∗ and every low-value agent twice consecutively.
3. In the following nh(nh−1)
2
periods, select every pair of high-value agents.
4. In the following nl(nl − 1) periods, select every pair of low-value agents twice consecutively.
If nm + nh ≥ 1: under both complete and incomplete information, after step 1, a star with
i∗ as the center and all other low-value agents as the periphery would be formed. In step 2,
under complete information no link would be formed; under incomplete information, between
i∗ and every low-value agent, a link would first be formed and then severed in the next period.
After step 3, there would be a link between every pair of high-value agents. It is clear that
under both complete and incomplete information, the network formed after step 3 is stable.
If nm+nh = 0: under both complete information, it is clear that no link ever forms. Under
incomplete information, during step 4 a link would be formed and then severed between every
pair of low-value agents. Therefore, under both complete and incomplete information, the
empty network after step 4 is stable.
Proof of Proposition 2. 1: We already know from Theorem 1 that if E[f(x)] < c, the net-
work stays empty under incomplete information for any κ and γ(∞). If nm+nh ≤ 1, clearly the
network stays empty under complete information for any κ and γ(∞), and the first part of the
statement is proved. If nm+nh ≥ 1, from the proof of Lemma 2, we can construct a γ(∞) such
that under complete information the formation process converges to some non-empty network.
Therefore the maximal difference can be achieved.
2: The claim that the minimal difference can always be achieved is a direct result from
Theorem 1.
If nh ≥ 2, in any stable network under complete and incomplete information, any pair of
high-value agents must be linked. Thus the maximal difference cannot be achieved. If nl = 0,
then the formation processes under complete and incomplete information would be the same,
so again the maximal difference cannot be achieved.
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If nh < 2 and nl > 0, first consider the following selection path when nm+nh ≥
c−maxi is low-value f(ki)
δc
+
1:
1. Fix an agent j∗ ∈ argmaxi is low-value f(ki). In the first nm + nh periods, select j
∗ and every
medium-value or high-value agent.
2. In the following nl−1 periods, select j
∗ and every other low-value agent twice consecutively.
3. In the remaining periods, let the selection path be the same as in the proof of Lemma 2.
Under complete information, as in the proof of Lemma 2, the formation process would con-
verge to a network only consisting of links between medium-value or high-value agents. Under
incomplete information, after step 1, a star with j∗ as the center and all the medium-value or
high-value agents as the periphery would be formed. In step 2, a link would be formed and
then severed between j∗ and every other low-value agent. After that, information becomes
complete and no low-value agent except j∗ would ever be linked. For every medium-value or
high-value agent, since nm + nh ≥
c−maxi is low-value f(ki)
δc
+ 1, the benefit from the link with j∗
is at least maxi is low-value f(ki) + δ(nm + nh − 1)c ≥ c, which implies that the agent has in-
centive to maintain the link. In addition, as nh < 2, no link would be formed between any
pair of medium-value or high-value agents, and thus the network is stable. This last fact also
shows that there are no common links between the networks converged to under complete and
incomplete information, and thus the maximal difference can be achieved.
Secondly, consider the following selection path when nm + nh ≥ 2, δ is sufficiently close to
1 and nl ≥ nm + nh − 1:
1. In the first period, select a low-value agent and a medium-value or high-value agent; in the
second period, select a second medium-value or high-value agent and the previous low-value
agent; in the third period, select a second low-value agent and the previous medium-value or
high-value agent; · · · ; in the 2(nm+nh−1)th period, select the last medium-value or high-value
agent and the previous low-value agent.
2. In the following nl − (nm + nh − 1) periods, select a medium-value or high-value agent and
every remaining low-value agent.
3. In the remaining periods, let the selection path be the same as in the proof of Lemma 2.
Under complete information, as in the proof of Lemma 2, the formation process would converge
to a network only consisting of links between medium-value or high-value agents. Under in-
complete information, after step 1, a line network only consisting of links between a low-value
agent and a medium-value or high-value agent is formed. After step 2, information becomes
complete, and as δ is sufficiently close to 1, the network is stable (note that δ being sufficiently
close to 1 is consistent with the condition nh < 2). Therefore there are no common links
between the networks converged to under complete and incomplete information, and thus the
maximal difference can be achieved.
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Proof of Lemma 3. Note that the social welfare is the sum of each agent’s payoff. For agents
having the same links in g1 and g2, it is clear that they are weakly better off in g1.
Now consider an agent i whose links in g1 is a proper superset of those in g2. Let ij1, · · · , ijm
denote i’s links in g1 but not in g2. Suppose that ui(ki, k−i, g1) < ui(ki, k−i, g2). It implies
that there must be a permutation of ij1, · · · , ijm, denoted ij
′
1, · · · , ij
′
m, such that for some
m′ ∈ {1, · · · , m}, ui(ki, k−i, g1 − ij
′
1 − · · · − ij
′
m′) > ui(ki, k−i, g1 − ij
′
1 − · · · − ij
′
m′−1).
Denote Li as an arbitrary proper subset of i’s links (including the empty set), and observe
that for any g and any of i’s link ij, ui(ki, k−i, g− ij)− ui(ki, k−i, g) ≥ ui(ki, k−i, g \Li− ij)−
ui(ki, k−i, g \ Li). Therefore, ui(ki, k−i, g1 − ij
′
m′)− ui(ki, k−i, g1) ≥ ui(ki, k−i, g1 − ij
′
1 − · · · −
ij′m′) − ui(ki, k−i, g1 − ij
′
1 − · · · − ij
′
m′−1) > 0, which implies that in g1, severing ij
′
m′ would
strictly increase i’s payoff. But this is a contradiction with the assumption of stability, and
thus it must be the case that ui(ki, k−i, g1) ≥ ui(ki, k−i, g2). Therefore, we can conclude that
g1 yields a weakly higher social welfare than g2.
Proof of Proposition 3. 1: We already know from Theorem 1 that if E[f(x)] < c, the net-
work stays empty under incomplete information, yielding WIC(κ) = 0. Therefore, WC(κ) >
WIC(κ) if and only if there is some non-empty network in G
∗
C(κ), which is equivalent to the
condition nm + nh > 1.
2: The claim that WC(κ) ≤WIC(κ) is a direct result from Theorem 2.
If nl = 0, G
∗
C(κ) and G
∗
IC(κ) are identical, and thus WC(κ) = WIC(κ).
If nl > 0 and nm + nh = 1, under complete information the network stays empty, yielding
a social welfare of 0. By Lemma 3, we know that in the stable wheel network, every agent’s
payoff is at least 0. In addition, since nm+nh = 1 the assumption that such a network is stable
implies that the total number of agents is at least 5, and that the medium-value or high-value
agent must be non-singleton in this network. Thus, the two low-value agents who link with
the medium-value or high-value agent must have a strictly positive payoff, which means that
the social welfare is strictly positive. Finally, it is easy to see that this network can be formed
under complete information. Thus WC(κ) < WIC(κ).
If nl > 0 and nm + nh > 1, consider the network g ∈ G
∗
C(κ) which yields the highest social
welfare (this network must exist, since there are only finitely many networks in G∗C(κ)). Let δ
be sufficiently close to 1 such that g is minimal. Thus, there exist medium-value or high-value
agents i and j such that ij is the only link i has in g. Note that since g is minimal, g is also
stable for any larger δ.
Consider a selection path under complete information in which g emerges, such that no link
is formed or severed after ij is formed, and no low-value agent is selected before ij is formed.
Under incomplete information, consider the following variation of this selection path: before the
period in which ij is formed, insert two periods: in the first period, select some low-value agent
i′ and i; in the second period, select i′ and j. Since E[f(x)] ≥ c, we know that ii′ and i′j would
both be formed. As δ gets sufficiently close to 1, the payoffs of the medium-value or high-value
agents would strictly increase due to the connection to i′. Therefore WC(κ) < WIC(κ).
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Proof of Proposition 4. We prove the result by construction. Consider the selection path
that i is selected twice consecutively with a low-value agent, then selected twice consecutively
with another low-value agent, and so on. We know that initially a link forms and then breaks
each time i is selected with a different low-value agent. Let p′m be the posterior probability that
i is a medium-value or high-value agent after the link between i and the mth low-value agent
breaks. We know that by Bayesian updating, p′m+1 =
p′m(1−p
′
0)
1−p′mp
′
0
with the initial condition that p′0
is equal to the prior probability that an agent is medium-value or high-value. By assumption,
we know that p′0 < 1. Therefore
p′m+1
p′m
=
1−p′0
1−p′mp
′
0
≤
1−p′0
1−p′
0
2 < 1, and thus there exists a sufficiently
large nl such that E[f(ki)|σ(t)] < c.
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